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A Failure to Communicate 
* Erwin Chemerinsky 
On Tuesday night, December 12, 2000, at about 10:00 p.m. eastern 
time, the Supreme Court released its decision in Bush v. Gore. 1 We all 
vividly remember the image of reporters standing outside the Supreme Court 
fumbling with copies of the opinion and trying to figure it out while 
speaking. Some got it badly wrong. In hindsight, it was a monumental 
failure to communicate by the Court. The public learned that night that the 
Court had ruled in favor of Bush, but there was not a clear explanation of 
why. This helped to fuel, though certainly was not entirely responsible for, 
the sense that the Court decided the outcome of the presidential election on a 
partisan basis. 
Bush v. Gore, of course, is an extreme and obvious example of the 
Court failing to communicate effectively with the American people. Yet 
in a sense, history repeated itself in June 2012, when CNN and Fox 
News initially reported that the Supreme Court had declared 
unconstitutional the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act. 2 This was arguably the most anticipated, and 
perhaps the most important, Supreme Court decision since Bush v. Gore, 
and two major media outlets got it wrong and misinformed the American 
public. 3 
Although these errors in reporting are not typical and the press 
certainly deserves a great deal of the blame for hasty and inaccurate 
reporting, they reflect a larger problem. The United States Supreme 
Court has a serious failure in communicating with the American public. 
In explaining this, I want to make three points. First, I want to 
describe why I believe that effective, clear communication by the 
Supreme Court is so important for the law and for society. Second, I 
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
I. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
2. Nat'! Fed'n of lndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
3. See Katherine Fung & Jack Mirkinson, Supreme Court Health Care Ruling: Fox News 
Wrong on Individual Mandate, HUFFINGTON POST (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 12/06/28/cnn-supreme-court-health-care-individual-
mandate_n_l633950.html; Tom Goldstein, We're Getting Wildly Different Assessments, 
SCOTUSBLOG, (July 7, 20 12), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/were-getting-wildly-differing-
assessments. 
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want to identify ways in which the Supreme Court fails to communicate 
effectively. Finally, I want to offer some suggestions to improve the 
Comi's communications. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION BY THE SUPREME 
COURT 
A starting point in discussing communication by the Supreme Court 
is to ask, why does it write opinions at all? Neither legislatures nor 
executives are required to give reasons for their decisions, though 
reasons are often given. But the expectation is that when the Supreme 
Court decides a case, there will be a written opinion explaining the 
rationale. A written opinion serves many functions. 4 
A judicial opinion provides an explanation to the parties and their 
attorneys as to why a court came to its conclusion. Perhaps this is less 
important at the Supreme Court, but judicial opinions at all levels of courts 
are a way in which judges make it seem that their rulings are not arbitrary 
and they tell the parties why they won or lost. A large percentage of opinions 
issued by lower courts are not published and therefore exist solely to explain 
the rationale for the decisions to the litigants. Judicial opinions are also 
thought to improve decision making. The need to write out a rationale 
requires more careful thought than simply announcing a result; there may be 
instances in which judges change their minds when they try to write out an 
explanation for their decisions. Also, written opinions increase the 
legitimacy of a court's decisions for both the litigants and society; the result 
seems less arbitrary when reasons are given for it. For the Supreme Court, 
and for appellate courts more generally, written opinions provide guidance 
for lower courts and for government officials who must adhere to the 
decisions. In a common-law system, where precedent is given weight, 
written opinions facilitate this; it is hard to imagine stare decisis without 
written opinions. 5 
It is possible, then, to identify many audiences for Supreme Court 
decisions. The effectiveness of the Court's communication can be 
assessed relative to each of these audiences. 
One audience, of course, is the parties. In a criminal case, an opinion 
for the government explains to a person why he or she will be 
4. I examine this more fully in Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rhetoric of Constillltional l.aw, 
100 MICH. L. RFV. 2008,2010-22 (2002). 
5. For an argument that the Supreme Court follows a common-law approach to developing 
constitutional law, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THF LIVING CONSTITUTION (20 I 0). 
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imprisoned or even executed. In a civil case, an opinion explains why 
people win or lose money or whether their interests are protected by the 
Constitution. Y ct, in reading opinions, there is little explicit recognition 
that the parties are an audience for the opinions. Supreme Court 
opinions, like those of every court, are densely written, often using legal 
jargon and technical language. This may be necessary to meet the needs 
of other audiences, but it also means that the opinions will be difficult for 
many of the parties to understand. 
A second audience for Supreme Court opinions is the press and, 
through them, the public. My sense is that relatively few in the public 
actually read the Supreme Court's opinions. The public thus learns ofthe 
Court's actions through the press. 1 would guess that a very small 
percentage of the American public, or even lawyers, read the Supreme 
Court's 193-page opinion concerning the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act. People learned what the Court did and why from 
the media. 
A third audience is the scholarly community. The Justices know that 
their opinions will be carefully read by academics who will write about 
them. Justices may be publicly disdainful of law review articles, 6 but 
they also know that there will be scholarly attention to their judicial 
opinions. It is hard for me to believe that the Justices are totally 
indifferent as to how their opinions are analyzed, praised, and criticized. 
After all, four of the current Justices-Antonio Scalia, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan-were primarily academics 
before going on to the bench. 
A fourth audience, and one of the most important for Supreme Court 
opinions, is the lower courts that must follow them and apply them to 
future cases. This imposes a crucial duty on the Court to write its 
opinions to provide guidance to lower courts. 
A fifth audience is the government officials who must apply and 
follow the Court's rulings. Because of the state action doctrine, 
constitutional decisions virtually always involve the government as one 
of the parties. Government officials at all levels must understand the 
Supreme Court's decisions and follow them in future actions. This 
imposes an important duty on the Court to write opinions in a way that 
guides these officials as to what is permissible and what is not allowed. 
6. See. e.g., Jess Bravin, Chiej'Justice Roherts on Ohama . .Justice Stevens. Law Reviews, 
More, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04 107/chief-
justicc-robcrts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-rcvicws-morc (Chief Justice Roberts saying that he 
rarely reads law review articles). 
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Sometimes, such as in criminal procedure cases, the audience is the 
police who need guidance as to what is permissible investigative 
behavior. Sometimes, the audience is the legislature that needs to be 
guided as to what future laws in the area are permissible and will not be 
struck down. 
Finally, it is important to see the Court in subsequent cases and the 
Justices in the future as a crucial audience for Supreme Court opinions. 
As explained above, in a system based on precedent, judicial opinions 
are crucial. The Justices are aware that the language of their opinion 
shapes the law and future decisions. Concurring and dissenting opinions 
seem to be often written with the hope of influencing future cases. 
Having identified the purposes of judicial opinions and the audiences 
for them, it is then possible to assess the effectiveness of the Court's 
communication in achieving these goals and in meeting the needs of 
these audiences. 
II. "WHAT WE GOT HERE IS A F AlLURE TO COMMUNICATE"7 
At every stage of the process-taking and denying cases, hearing 
cases, releasing decisions, and writing opinions-the Supreme Court 
fails to effectively communicate. 
A. Granting and Denying Review 
In October Term 2011, the Supreme Court decided sixty-five cases 
after briefing and oral argument. 8 The Court has over 10,000 petitions 
for review each year. 9 Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in the 
overwhelming majority of cases is a loss for the party seeking certiorari. 
I realize, of course, that the denial of certiorari is not a decision on the 
merits, but for the lawyer and the party it is often the end, the final 
loss. 10 
The Supreme Court never gives reasons why it is denying certiorari. 
Usually only an order is issued, though occasionally there will be a 
7. This, of course, is a famous line from the movie, COOL HAND LUKE (Warner Bros. 
Pictures 1967). 
8. Kedar Bhatia, Final October Term 2011 Stat Pack and Summarv Memo. SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 30, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 12/06/final-octo ber-term-20 11-stat-pack-
and-summary-memo. 
9. PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE, A REPORTER'S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (2010). 
l 0. In criminal cases from state courts, there is the possibility of a habeas corpus petition in 
federal district court. 
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dissent from the denial of certiorari or an opinion respecting the denial of 
certiorari. The lawyers and the parties are left to guess as to why they 
lost. Sometimes it is possible to speculate that the Court did not take a 
matter because there was not a split among the lower courts, or the Court 
wanted to wait for the issue to further "percolate," or there was not a 
significant federal question. But there are so many instances from 
virtually every conference where the Court denies certiorari despite the 
presence of a split among the circuits and in cases presenting important, 
unresolved issues of federal law. 
As a lawyer who so many times has been in this situation, including 
in capital cases, the denial of certiorari is intensely frustrating. It feels 
arbitrary because no reason is given or even hinted. All of the benefits of 
written opinions described above are missing. A decision has been 
made-the Court has decided not to take the case and thus the lower 
court ruling stands-but it seems arbitrary and there is nothing to say to a 
client, even one facing life in prison or death, except that the Court takes 
few cases and didn't take his or hers. 
B. Hearing Cases 
Supreme Court proceedings, of course, are government events and 
there should be a strong presumption that people should be able to watch 
government proceedings. 11 Arguments in the Supreme Court always 
have been open to the public, but relatively few can attend in person. 
There are only 250 seats and people literally camp out all night, or for 
even longer, to be able to attend arguments in high-profile cases. 
Broadcasting Supreme Court arguments would allow the entire 
nation to watch a crucial branch of government at work. Allowing 
broadcasts of Supreme Court arguments would help society understand 
the issues before the Court. For example, many thought that the central 
question before the Court with regard to the Affordable Care Act was 
whether people had a right to not purchase health insurance. That, of 
course, was not the issue at all; the Court's focus was entirely on the 
scope of congressional power and the ability to force states to comply 
with federal requirements. Hearing the oral arguments would have made 
this much clearer for people. 
Also, broadcasting Supreme Court arguments would help society 
understand the judicial process. The reality is that cases are heard in the 
II. See, e.g, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 ( 1980) (press and the 
public have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials). 
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Supreme Court because there is no clear right or wrong answer; every 
case presents a choice and rarely, if ever, does the Court hear a case 
where there are not reasonable arguments on each side. Allowing people 
to listen and watch oral arguments would make this clear and apparent. 
And broadcasting arguments would allow people to better 
understand the Court. They would see that cases are heard and decided 
by nine human beings, each with their own personalities. I believe that 
people of all political persuasions would be impressed and see that the 
Court is comprised of nine very intelligent individuals who work very 
hard to decide cases based on their best understanding of the law. 
Unfortunately though, the Supreme Court's rules prohibit live 
broadcasting of oral arguments. I always have been struck that many of 
the arguments against allowing cameras in the courtroom are really 
arguments against allowing the public and reporters to be there at all, 
something that is thankfully unthinkable as well as unconstitutional. 
At least since Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court has on occasion, in 
high-profile cases, allowed broadcasting of the audiotapes of oral , 
arguments immediately after they conclude. This occurred most recently 
after the oral arguments concerning the constitutionality of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act. C-SPAN has taken advantage of this 
opportunity, broadcasting the audiotapes as soon as they become 
available and showing still photographs of the Justices and advocates as 
their voices are heard. But if people can hear the tapes just minutes after 
the arguments conclude, it is impossible to see the harm in allowing them 
to see the proceedings live just an hour earlier. 
What possible rationale is there for excluding cameras from Supreme 
Court proceedings? 12 One concern is that broadcasting oral arguments 
will change the behavior of lawyers and Justices. Perhaps that concern 
has some basis in trial courts where there is worry about the effect of 
cameras on witnesses. Even there, however, the experience of many 
jurisdictions with cameras in the courtrooms and many studies refute any 
basis for concern. 
Especially in the Supreme Court, however, there seems little basis 
for worry. The lawyers, who are focused on answering intense 
12. The primary advocate among academics against cameras in the Supreme Court has been 
Professor Nancy Marder. See, e.g., Nancy Marder, Sunday Dialogue: Putting the Justices on TV, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. I I, 201 I), http://www.nytimcs.com/2011112!1 1/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue-
putting-the-justices-on-tv.html?pagewantcd=all&_r=O. 
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questioning from the Justices, are unlikely to alter their arguments to 
play to the cameras. Besides, anyone who has witnessed a Supreme 
Court argument knows that the Justices are firmly in control of the 
proceedings. Justices and lawyers know that the arguments, especially in 
high-profile cases, are going to be extensively covered in the media and 
that audiotapes will be publicly available. In this context, there is no 
reason why live broadcasting will change behavior. 
I have heard Justices express concern that if television cameras 
were allowed, the media might broadcast excerpts that offer a 
misleading impression of oral arguments and the Court. But that is 
true when any government proceeding is taped or even when reporters 
cover any event. A newspaper or television reporter could quote a 
Justice's question or a lawyer's answer out of context. The Justices 
might be afraid that an excerpt of oral argument might appear on Jon 
Stewart or Jay Leno and be used for entertainment purposes; perhaps 
they will even be mocked. But that is a cost of being a democratic 
society and of holding a prominent position in government. In no 
other context would Supreme Court Justices say that government 
officials can protect themselves from possible criticism by cutting off 
public access. 
Indeed, the Court's decision to preclude live broadcasts seems to 
be about protecting its own credibility. Over a decade ago, there was a 
panel discussion at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference about 
cameras in the courtroom. Fred Graham from Court TV challenged 
Justice Stephen Breyer as to why Supreme Court proceedings could 
not be broadcast. Justice Breyer responded by indicating that the 
public approval ratings of the Court were high compared to the other 
branches of government. 13 
But this mistakenly blames the messenger. There is no reason to 
believe that the Supreme Court's legitimacy is helped by prohibiting 
live broadcasts. Quite the contrary, I believe that the Court's 
credibility only will be enhanced if more people see the Justices at 
work. Anyone who watches a Supreme Court argument will see nine 
highly intelligent, superbly prepared individuals grappling with some 
of the nation's hardest questions. The public will see, too, that there 
are no easy answers to most constitutional questions and that there are 
usually compelling arguments on both sides. That can only increase 
13. Professor Marder echoes this argument. See id. 
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the public's understanding of the law and its appreciation for the 
Court. 
C. The Release of Decisions 
From a communications perspective, there are many problems with 
how the Supreme Court releases its decisions. First, the Court gives no 
notice as to which cases will be announced on which day. Unless it is the 
last day of the term, in which case all the remaining decisions are 
expected, there is no way to know what cases will come down on any 
day. I never have understood why the Court can't announce, say the day 
before, which cases will be handed down. The California Supreme Court 
does this, and I never have seen any problem with it. Giving prior notice 
will allow reporters and commentators to be better prepared; they can 
review the cases that are about to be handed down and be in a better 
position to discuss them. Especially in a world where instant reporting 
and instant commenting occurs, better advance preparation can only help 
in more accurately informing the public. 
Second, when the Court announces a decision, there is no clear, 
intelligent summary of the decision. I always have thought that a 
decision should be accompanied by a paragraph description of what the 
Court did. Like the syllabus that accompanies a decision, this would not 
be authoritative or part of the decision. Providing such a summary could 
avoid the mistaken reports that occurred when the Affordable Care Act 
decision was released. It would have been easy to have a paragraph that 
said: "The individual mandate was upheld, by a 5-4 margin, as a valid 
exercise of Congress's taxing power. Five Justices said that the 
individual mandate was not within the scope of Congress's commerce 
power or necessary and proper clause authority. The Court ruled 7-2 that 
forcing states to comply with the new Medicaid requirements by tying all 
Medicaid funds to compliance was unduly coercive." The description 
could have been more elaborate than this, but even a paragraph summary 
like this would help tremendously. 
Third, there is no broadcast of the announcing of decisions. Justices 
announce their decisions from the bench, often briefly, sometimes in 
detail. Occasionally, dissents are read from the bench, often quite 
dramatically. Sometimes Justices say things in these oral 
pronouncements that are not in the written opinions. I do not understand 
why the announcing of decisions is not broadcast. As explained above, 
the primary argument against cameras in the Supreme Court is that it will 
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adversely affect behavior of lawyers and judges. This concern has no 
basis if all the Justices are doing is announcing their decisions. 
Fourth, too many decisions are announced per day at the end of the 
term. Often during the last week of the term, multiple decisions are 
announced on a couple of days, such as in 2012 on Monday, June 25, and 
Thursday, June 28. In some years, several major, enormously important 
cases came down on the last day of the term. Having multiple major 
cases on the same day makes it harder for reporters to cover and harder 
for people to understand what the Court has done. Why not have the 
decisions spread out more that week, releasing one or two decisions each 
day of the week, rather than multiple decisions on a couple of days? This 
would allow for more in-depth reporting and greater understanding on 
the part of the public. 
D. Supreme Court Opinions 
Obviously, it would be easy to wish that more Justices wrote like 
Robert Jackson or Louis Brandeis. But beyond that, there are ways in 
which Court opinions fail to adequately communicate. 
First, they have become much too long and thus far more difficult for 
lower courts and government officials to read and rely upon. Adam 
Liptak wrote of how the October 2009 Term set the all-time record for 
length of opinions. 14 Liptak wrote: 
Brown v. Board of Education, the towering 1954 decision that held 
segregated public schools unconstitutional, managed to do its work in 
fewer than 4,000 words. When the Roberts court returned to just an 
aspect of the issue in 2007 in Parents Involved v. Seattle, it published 
some 47,000 words, enough to rival a short novel. In more routine 
cases, too, the court has been setting records. The median length of 
majority opinions reached an all-time high in the last term. 15 
The opinions have not gotten shorter since then. The decision in the 
Affordable Care Act case was 193 pages long. Opinions over 100 pages 
long occur in far less prominent cases too. 16 I long have believed that the 
14. Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words hut Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2010, at AI. 
15. !d. 
16. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (noting that the admission of expert 
testimony about the results of DNA testing performed by nontestifying analysts did not violate the 
Confrontation Clause, even when the defendant has no opportunity to confront the actual analysts, 
because the laboratory report here was deemed to be nontestimonial). 
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Court would benefit from word and page limits, like those imposed on 
litigants. 
Second, too often the Court fails to give guidance for the lower 
courts that will need to follow its decisions. As explained above, this is 
one of the most important audiences for the Court. Yet, I often have had 
the sense that the Court does not focus nearly enough on the need for 
clarity to guide lower court judges. Examples are plentiful. In Crawford 
v. Washington, the Court significantly changed the rules of evidence in 
criminal trials, holding that prosecutors could not use "testimonial" 
statements ofunavailable witnesses, even ifthey are reliable. 17 The issue 
of what is "testimonial" was then something that would arise constantly 
in state and federal trial courts across the country. But the Court made no 
effort to give guidance to the lower courts and define it. 
Another example comes from the area of civil litigation: Philip 
Morris USA v. Williams. 18 For the third time in eleven years, the Court 
imposed constitutional limits on punitive damage awards. 19 Philip 
Morris, though, seemed to go further than the earlier rulings in restricting 
punitive damages. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that juries 
cannot base punitive damage awards on harms to third parties other than 
the plaintiffs in the suit. 20 However, the Court qualified this holding by 
saying that juries may consider harm to third parties in assessing the 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, 21 which the Court says is the 
most important factor in determining the size of a punitive damage 
award.22 
Trial judges are likely to struggle for years as to how to formulate 
jury instructions that simultaneously tell the jury to consider and not to 
consider harms to others besides the plaintiffs. Appellate courts are left 
with little guidance as to when punitive damage awards are allowed and 
when they are unconstitutional. Juries can consider harm to others in 
determining reprehensibility, but cannot base punitive damages on the 
17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004 ). 
18. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
19. !d. at 353. The earlier cases were State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003 ), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 ( 1996). 
20. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 356-57. 
21. !d. at 357. 
22. !d. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 53S U.S. at 
419 ("[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the 
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). 
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harm to others. How can a court of appeals possibly determine whether 
the punitive damage award violates this command? 
Finally, I believe that the increasing use of sarcasm and even ridicule 
in judicial opinions is undesirable. No Justice in Supreme Court history 
has consistently written with the sarcasm of Justice Scalia. No doubt, this 
makes his opinions among the most entertaining to read. He has a great 
flair for language and does not mince words when he disagrees with a 
position. But I think that this sends exactly the wrong message to law 
students and attorneys about what type of discourse is appropriate in a 
formal legal setting and how it is acceptable to speak to one another. 
Examples of this abound; consider a few. In dissenting opinions, 
Justice Scalia describes the majority's approaches as "nothing short of 
ludicrous" and "beyond the absurd,"23 "entirely irrational,"24 and not 
"pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny."25 He has declared that a majority 
opinion is "nothing short of preposterous" and "has no foundation in 
American constitutional law, and barely pretends to." 26 He talks about 
how "one must grieve for the Constitution" because of a majority's 
approach. 27 He calls the approaches taken in majority opinions 
"preposterous,"28 and "so unsupported in reason and so absurd in 
application [as] unlikely to survive."29 He speaks of how a majority 
opinion "vandaliz[es] ... our people's traditions."30 In a recent dissent, 
Justice Scalia declared: 
Today's tale ... is so transparently false that professing to believe it 
demeans this institution. But reaching a patently incorrect conclusion 
on the facts is a relatively benign judicial mischief; it affects, after all, 
only the case at hand. In its vain attempt to make the incredible 
plausible, however-or perhaps as an intended second goal-today's 
opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in 
a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the 
obfuscator oflast resort. 31 
23. Lee v. Weisman ex ref Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 637, 638 (1992) (Scalia, J.. dissenting). 
24. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 685 ( 1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
25 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,748 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 ( 1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
28. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 735 ( 1994) (Scalia, 
J .. dissenting). 
29. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,542,543 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
30. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rei. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 163 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
31. Michiganv. Bryant, 131 S.Ct.ll43, 1168(20li)(Scalia,J.,dissenting). 
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I do not deny that such language makes for entertaining reading. But 
I believe it is a terrible model for law students and lawyers as to how to 
write. Such sarcasm and ridicule adds nothing of substance and is not the 
way we should want our judges, our attorneys, and our law students to 
communicate. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
My suggestions for improving communication by the Supreme Court 
are implicit in the above criticisms. To be explicit, 
I. The Court should offer brief reasons for denying certiorari. Any 
explanation would be better than nothing. Perhaps it could even be a 
sentence, "Certiorari denied because of the lack of an adequate split 
among the lower courts," or "Certiorari denied because of perceived 
procedural problems in the case." I am not optimistic that the Court will 
ever do this, because it is additional work and because it is assuming that 
there is a consensus among the Justices who denied certiorari. Yet, from 
the perspective of lawyers and parties who have lost what is often their 
final chance, some explanation would be tremendously helpful and 
appreciated. 
2. All Supreme Court public proceedings should be broadcast. This 
includes oral arguments and the announcement of decisions and anything 
else done in open court. 
3. The Court should announce a day in advance which cases will 
come down on the following day. 
4. There should be a paragraph or two released along with decisions 
summarizing the Court's decisions. These would not be authoritative and 
would have no precedential value. In this way, it would be the same as 
the syllabus now released, with just the additional paragraph or two to 
help clarify. 
5. The Court should spread out its release of decisions during the last 
weeks of the term. There is no reason why decisions cannot come out on 
four or five days of those weeks rather than on a couple of days. 
6. There should be presumptive word and page limits for Supreme 
Court opinions. The Court, in fact all courts, believe that the discipline of 
word and page limits leads to better briefs. The same is true for the 
Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For better or worse, the Supreme Court gets the last word on so 
many of the issues that are among the most important and controversial 
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in American society. In just these couple of years, the Court has been and 
will be deciding the fate of state immigration laws, such as Arizona's SB 
1070, the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, whether colleges 
and universities can use race as a factor in admissions decisions, and 
likely whether there is a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians. 
Yet most people have far less sense of the Court than other institutions of 
American government. In part, this is because of the Court's serious 
failure to communicate. There are many simple steps that can be taken to 
improve communication by the Court. But do the Justices care? Will they 
be willing to consider changing practices that have long been followed? 
Can they look at these issues not just from their perspective, but from 
that of the lawyers, judges, journalists, scholars, and public who read 
their opinions? I am not optimistic. 
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